The theory of automatic and controlled processing outlined in Schneider and Shiffrin (1977) and in Shiffrin and Schneider (1977) is defended in the present note. We argue that the criticisms of Ryan (1983) range from irrelevant to incorrect, based on a brief review of data from the 1977 articles and on some more recent publications. The evidence Ryan discusses comes from the prememorized-list paradigm, a paradigm that undoubtedly involves automatic and controlled processes but probably not automatic detection and controlled search. We argue that a variety of mechanisms consistent with our general theory, some automatic and some controlled, could be operating in the prememorized-list paradigm and can explain the observed results.
The theory of automatic and controlled processing outlined in Schneider and Shiffrin (1977) and in Shiffrin and Schneider (1977) is defended in the present note. We argue that the criticisms of Ryan (1983) range from irrelevant to incorrect, based on a brief review of data from the 1977 articles and on some more recent publications. The evidence Ryan discusses comes from the prememorized-list paradigm, a paradigm that undoubtedly involves automatic and controlled processes but probably not automatic detection and controlled search. We argue that a variety of mechanisms consistent with our general theory, some automatic and some controlled, could be operating in the prememorized-list paradigm and can explain the observed results.
A theory of automatic and controlled processing was outlined and given empirical support in the articles of Schneider and Shiffrin (1977) and Shiffrin and Schneider (1977) . The characteristics of both types of processes were established through examination of particular examples of each of these classes of processes. These examples, of critical importance in many search and attention tasks, were termed automatic detection and controlled search, and their characteristics were determined empirically.
In particular, in memory-or visual-search tasks, consistent mapping (CM) refers to paradigms in which targets and distractors never exchange roles over trials of the study. Varied mapping (VM) refers to paradigms in which targets on one trial may be distractors on another, and vice versa. We demonstrated that extended testing in CM paradigms led to a marked flattening of the set-size functions and to a number of other prominent effects. We termed the processes used by subjects, automatic detection. In contrast, the use of a VM procedure, however extended, leaves intact the form and the slope of the set-size function. We termed the processes used in this situation, controlled search.
Based on the findings, we postulated that automatic processing is generally a fast, parallel, fairly effortless process that is not limited by short-term memory capacity, is not under direct subject control, and performs well-developed skilled behaviors. It typically develops when subjects process stimuli in consistent fashion over many trials; it is difficult to suppress, modify, or ignore, once learned. Controlled processing is often slow, generally serial, effortful, capacity limited, subject regulated, and is used to deal with novel or inconsistent information. It is needed in situations where the responses required to stimuli vary from one trial or situation to the next, and is easily modified, suppressed, or ignored at the desire of the subject. Finally, all tasks are carried out by complex mixtures of controlled and automatic processes used in combination. (For a more recent discussion see Schneider, Dumais, & Shiffrin, in press, and Schneider & Fisk, in press-a) . Ryan (1983) confuses the general concepts of automatic and controlled processing with the particular instances. He argues, probably correctly, that automatic detection and controlled search cannot explain the results from what we shall term the prememorized-list paradigm, but this fact is irrelevant if automatic detection and controlled search are not used to produce responses in this paradigm. We argue that other automatic and controlled processes are at work in the prememorized-list paradigm.
Stripped of references to the prememorized-list paradigm, Ryan's (1983) note contains little more than polemics. No criticisms are directed toward the research reported in our 1977 articles . In those articles we reported roughly 14 new experiments the results from which were used to generate and elaborate the theory. Not one of our studies or results are mentioned by Ryan. We also used the theory to analyze a large number of studies in the literature, clarifying what had been a somewhat disjointed set of findings. He mentions almost none of these findings or the explications based on our theory and mentions none of the results in the articles published by us or by our colleagues since 1977. Despite Ryan's expostulations, we think our 1977 exposition remains cogent and convincing and based directly on the evidence.
Prememorized-List-Recognition Paradigm
The results discussed in Ryan's (1983) note are virtually all from the prememorized-list paradigm. The subject learns lists of items in advance of the test session, to a criterion assuring that they can be reproduced with high accuracy. The test session requires that the subject make yes-no decisions distinguishing list items from distractors not learned on the lists. Reaction time is plotted as a function of memorized list length. Juola (e.g., 1973, 1974) suggested that subjects utilize a familiarity judgment to respond on most trials in this paradigm, with a rapid search of long-term memory occurring on those trials when the familiarity judgment was not easy. We agreed that this model was plausible (i.e., Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977, p. 176) . However, we did not delve into this paradigm in detail because we felt that numerous mechanisms could be operating, and the paradigm was poorly designed to distinguish between them. To make our views clear, we now consider the various types of processes that subjects could use in the prememorized-list paradigm.
Contextual Familiarity
Perhaps the most likely candidate for a process underlying responding in the prememorized-list paradigm is temporal-contextual familiarity. After all, aside from the fact that the list is learned to criterion before testing begins, the paradigm is quite similar to traditional recognition-memory tasks. In such tasks most researchers have proposed that subjects respond on the basis of familiarity at least some of the time. Familiarity judgments presumably entail an assessment of the recency of the test item, or the list-context associated with the list item. Familiarity can be quite simple as in the models of Mandler (1980) or Atkinson and Juola (1974) -in which cases increases of latency with list length would not be predicted-or quite complex, as in the models of Ratcliff (1978) , J. A. Anderson (1973) , and Gillund and Shiffrin (1984) , in which cases increases of latency with list length would be predicted. (A closely related notion is that of strength as a basis for discrimination that has been proposed by Corballis, 1975 .) The generation of a familiarity value may well occur automatically, so that relatively few resources might be required to respond; in particular, an explicit search of the memory set is probably not required.
Automatic Detection and Categorical Classification
According to our theory, sufficiently extended consistent testing in the prememorized-list paradigm should lead to the development of two types of automatic processes. First, the individual target stimuli should develop an automatic tendency to attract attention. This is called automatic detection in the 1977 articles and leads to list-length independence. Second, the target stimuli should coalesce as a unitary category, such that a category code would be generated automatically whenever a member is presented. This code could then be used to judge list membership in a way that would not depend on list length (see Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977, Experiment 3) . In the prememorized-list studies to date, sufficiently extended testing has not been used to allow an inference that automatism of either type has developed, although it is conceivable that the training to criterion in advance of the test session(s) could have led to such development.
The possible use of automatic detection and automatic categorical classification is difficult to assess in prememorized-list studies. If the only alternative process were controlled serial search, then such processes would produce a flatter set-size function. However, processes like familiarity would also produce flatter set-size functions, so more sophisticated methods would have to be used to disambiguate these possibilities.
Controlled Serial Search
In prememorized-list studies, the longest lists usually contain more items than can be maintained in short-term store (STS). Thus we would not expect controlled serial search to be used in such conditions. However, there is at least one way in which subjects are quite likely to use controlled serial search in this paradigm. They may read into STS some of the memory set (perhaps all of it in the cases where the set size is small enough) and may carry out a serial search of just this portion of the memory set, perhaps in parallel with some other process. Because such a strategy does not noticeably improve performance at large set sizes, controlled serial search is likely to play a significant role and reduce latencies only when the set size is very small.
Controlled Search of Long-Term Memory
Mandler (1980), Atkinson and Juola (1974) , and others have proposed that recognition involves two phases: familiarity and some sort of search of longterm memory. Shiffrin (1980, 1981) have given a detailed exposition of one model of long-term memory search. In their model, search is a complex mixture of controlled and automatic components and includes a sequential series of samples from long-term memory, so that latencies would surely rise with list length, possibly linearly. Other search models, such as those of J. R. Anderson (1976) and Ratcliff and Murdock (1976) , would also predict latencies to rise with list length. Note that the availability of alternative processes, such as familiarity, might well eliminate the need for controlled search of long-term memory.
Discussion and Summary
There is strong, independent evidence from a variety of paradigms that each of the processes discussed above exists and can be used in its own right. In theory, it should be possible for the subject to use any of these processes, either alone, in combination together, or in mixtures across trials.
1 Note also that all of these processes are consistent with the general theory of automatic and controlled processing expressed in the 1977 articles.
Given the variety of processes that could be operating in the prememorized-list paradigm, and the difficulty in choosing among them, it is hard to see how the data from this paradigm can be used either to support or to falsify the concepts of automatic and controlled processing. For example, because Ryan (1983) thinks that we would argue that controlled search is used in the prememorized-list paradigm, he concludes that we could not explain the relatively flat reaction-time functions of set size that can occur on even the first test of a target. Of course we would expect such a result if the subject were using any of the processes of automatic detection, familiarity judgment, or category classification. (We think that familiarity is most likely.)
In summary, no crucial conclusions for our theory can be drawn to date from the results of prememorized-list studies because the design of the paradigm allows many mechanisms to operate and does not allow these to be disentangled. Because we think that the prememorized-list results are very likely the result of a familiarity judgment, or a mixture of this process with others, the criticisms of our theory based on this work are weak at best and probably irrelevant.
Characteristics of Automatic Detection
and Controlled Search Ryan (1983) lists a number of characteristics of controlled and automatic processes and argues that these are contradicted by existing data. All of the substantive criticisms are based on data from the prememorized-list paradigm and, as we have argued, these are either irrelevant or incorrectly applied. Furthermore, the criticisms fail to take into account the substantial array of data reported in the 1977 articles that provided the evidentiary support for the theory. Note well that Ryan makes no attempt to provide alternative explanations for the data reported in the original articles. Given these facts, there is no real need to carry this note further. Nevertheless, we do not wish Ryan's remarks to gain credibility through our failure to reply. Therefore we deal with these remarks briefly.
Load Dependence and Independence
It is doubtful that anyone could read our 1977 articles without learning that consistent mapping of targets and distractors produces automatic detection and small load effects in search tasks, and that varied mapping produces controlled serial search and large load effects. For example, in a search experiment whose results were given in Figure 6 of Schneider and Shiffrin (1977) , subjects searched for one of four memory-set characters in either VM or CM conditions. As the display size changed from one for four characters, latency rose 240 ms in the VM condition and just 10 ms in the CM condition. Ryan apparently feels, nonetheless, that consistency of training does not determine load effects because Sternberg (1966) found that his fixedset condition showed the same slope as his variedset condition. We dealt with this finding at length in the 1977 articles (Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977, p. 39) . In short, Sternberg's results were surely produced by the changes in the fixed set that occurred after relatively short blocks. Thus his fixed-set procedure was actually close to what we termed VM. Any reader who has doubts concerning the results of true fixed-set training should feel free to invest a few hours of experimentation: The marked flattening of the set-size function is trivial to produce and must have been replicated hundreds of times by the date of this writing. (See Fisk & Schneider, 1 The problems of deciding which processes are used in the prememorized-list paradigm are compounded by the typical training and test procedures. For example, the lists are learned either in an uncontrolled environment or in a training session using a learning criterion for stopping. It is obvious that a list of 2 items can be learned virtually instantaneously, whereas many trials may be required to learn a list of 30 items. In what sense then can these lists be said to be equated with respect to any of the processes that have been discussed, such as attention attraction, category learning, familiarity, or strength? As another example, the test phase generally involves unequal numbers of tests for items on lists of different length, and for targets and distractors, making it difficult to evaluate learning that might be occurring during the course of testing itself.
1983, for another striking demonstration of this phenomenon involving category search.)
Before leaving this topic, we feel it is important to point out that zero slope is an ideal seldom expected in actual studies using CM training. Even automatic processes will probably show a small load effect. More important, the subject may well carry out controlled search in parallel with automatic detection, reducing the latency values at the smallest set sizes (this issue is discussed in the next section). Thus, it is more important in search studies to note the dramatic lowering of the slope as one moves from VM to CM conditions-and to note the dramatic practice effects in the CM conditions-than to be overly concerned by set-size functions that deviate from zero slope. Ryan (1983) proposed that subjects in item-identification tasks can use two processes in parallel, with the fastest triggering a yes response. He gives no details of the component processes, other than to suggest that one depends on set size to a greater degree than does the other, so that one tends to trigger first at small set sizes and the other triggers first at large set sizes. Presumably also, both processes lead to linear functions of set size, because the results of such studies are fit by Ryan with bilinear functions. He apparently feels that to the degree that such a hypothesis is an accurate representation of the findings, support for our theory is eroded.
Role of Parallel Processes in Search Tasks
In fact, just the opposite is the case. As discussed at great length in the 1977 articles, one of the primary characteristics of automatic processing is the ability of such a process to be carried out in parallel with other processes, without cost. An exception to this rule occurs if the attention system is itself invoked by the automatic process, in which case interference with another control process could take place. However, when the task is like those that Ryan discusses, in which a positive response can be given on the basis of either of two processeswhichever triggers first-then this exception is irrelevant. In such a case, there is nothing to hinder the subject from using two processes in parallel, as long as at least one is automatic. If one of the processes is controlled, then the subject might not choose to use it, but doing so would only lead to a benefit.
Whether two parallel processes can be used by the subject, and what the nature of these processes are, depends of course on the task. In VM paradigms of the kind used by Sternberg (1975) , in which no categorical distinction, automatic detection, or other response basis is available, only controlled processing is used-much evidence along these lines was presented in the 1977 articles. A different situation arises when distractors are used that do not match the category of the memory set. In this case, automatic category-code generation takes place in parallel with controlled search and allows truncation of the search and flattening of the set-size function (see Jones & Anderson, 1982) . Automatic detection and controlled search can also be carried out together. An extended discussion and some persuasive data from Ellis and Chase (1971) is given in Schneider and Shiffrin (1977, pp. 40-41) . We have often observed in our own work that even lengthy training in CM conditions leaves a small but nonzero slope to the set-size function (e.g., see Dumais, 1979 ). This result is presumably due to speeded responding at the smallest set sizes due to controlled search carried out in parallel with automatic detection.
The best examples of parallelism of automatic and controlled processes occur when two separate tasks with distinct responses are to be carried out simultaneously (rather than one task to be carried out by two parallel processes). An excellent demonstration of this sort has been reported by Schneider and Fisk (1982-a) . Subjects were asked to carry out automatic detection on one diagonal of a fourcharacter display and controlled search on the other, targets on either diagonal requiring responses. Control conditions required search on only one diagonal. This study utilized a multiple-frame procedure. That is, a rapid sequence of frames of four characters each was presented, with the subject attempting to detect the presence of targets on either diagnonal. Detection accuracy was the dependent measure. The automatic diagonal used consistent mapping of targets and distractors; the controlled diagonal used varied mapping.
After sufficient practice, subjects instructed to give maximum effort to the controlled task could carry out both tasks together at accuracy levels equal to those in the respective control conditions. The results are shown in Figure 1 , in the left-hand panel. Note that when both diagonals required controlled search, even great amounts of practice could not bring the joint-task accuracy levels anywhere close to the single-task levels. This is shown in the righthand panel of Figure 1 .
In summary, it is an essential component of our theory that automatic and controlled processes may occur in parallel, without cost, but that two or more controlled processes cannot exhibit such a property.
2 Ryan (1983) claims that he (and Forrin & Morin, 2 If two controlled processes operate together, do not stress short-term capacity, and are at ceiling, costs may not be seen. However, if one adds a third task requiring capacity, so that short-term capacity is stressed, then the costs caused by the first two control processes used together should be observable.
VM SINGLE a' (DUAL EMPHASIZED! Figure 1 . Detection performance in a multiple-frame search task, measured by A', in single-task and in dual-task conditions. (Single-task performance is given on the axes, whereas dual-task performance is given by the central points, for both tasks separately. Three frame times were used. The left-hand panel shows performance when one task was varied mapping, VM [controlled] , and one was consistent mapping, [automatic] . The right-hand panel shows performance when both tasks are VM [controlled] . [Data taken from Schneider & Fisk, 1982a.]) 1969, although those authors made no such claim) has obtained data showing independent and parallel controlled processes. The sole basis for this claim is the single datum obtained in an experiment requiring search both through a prememorized list and a short-term varied set: Namely, the first two points on the set-size function for the prememorized set exhibits a slope value close to that seen for the first two points on the varied-set function.
The logic used here is not very crisp. Although controlled serial search should give a linear set-size function with the typical slope value, the converse is not true. Imagine an increasing set-size function produced by, say, an automatic familiarity mechanism. This function might increase in negatively accelerated fashion, and, somewhere on this function, two successive points might be found to exhibit a slope value typical of controlled search. It is obvious that one would not want to conclude that controlled search was being utilized for those two particular set sizes, yet this is in effect what Ryan argued in his note. (Also, the data reported by Ryan can be accounted for on the basis of an automatic familiarity process operating in parallel with controlled search.)
Ryan makes another attack on our theoretical position that is rooted in the parallelism of automatic detection and controlled search. According to our theory, automatic detection is learned gradually in CM conditions; at the start of training the subject must use controlled search, but as learning progresses, automatic detection begins to operate in parallel with controlled search and eventually provides the dominant response basis. Ryan observes that the effects of onset of automatic detection are seen at the largest set size first, and claims that such data contradict our theory. Exactly the opposite is the case.
As automatic detection begins to develop, it is rather weak and slow and finishes first only when the controlled search is very long in duration. Thus a flattening of the set-size function is seen first when set size is very large, and only later does such flattening occur for the smaller set sizes (see the discussion in Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977, p. 40 ). This result is predicted for all studies in which the same total set of CM targets is utilized in the different set-size conditions (although different instances randomly chosen from the total set are displayed on particular trials). Our own studies use such a procedure, and even Ryan's studies use a nested procedure in which at least some stimuli appear in all set-size conditions.
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In summation, parallel processing involving automatic mechanisms is an integral part of our theory. Controlled processing may be carried out in parallel with automatic processing, at the subject's option, but two controlled processes cannot be carried out in parallel without the sharing of resources and some cost. The data that we know of are consistent with these proposals.
Factors That Determine Automatization
We are a bit amazed by the suggestions in Ryan's (1983, p . 7) article that we have "no a priori theoretical notion" concerning the factors that determine attention demands. Much of our experimental work has been designed to establish just these factors. Surely no one could read our papers without learning that CM produces automatic attending to the consistent targets.
An experiment by Dumais (1979; reported in Shiffrin & Dumais, 1981) gives additional information about the factors that produce attentional demands. We have argued that CM training produces enhanced attending to the consistent targets. Is there any attentional effect for the consistent distractors? Subjects were trained extensively in both CM and VM search conditions until performance reached asymptote. Memory set size was always 1, and display size was both 4 and 16. The set-size slope after training was much larger, as usual, for the VM condition. At this point, a variety of transfer conditions were carried out. In one case the CM targets were retained intact and new distractors were introduced (either new items or old VM items). In another case the old CM distractors were retained intact and new targets were introduced (either new items or old VM items). In all of these conditions transfer was virtually perfect; that is, the set-size slopes were about equal to those in the CM training conditions.
The model proposed by Dumais (1979) to account for these results emphasizes the role of learning to attend. Untrained stimuli are assumed to have a normal, intermediate tendency to attract attention when presented. Consistent training as a target enhances the attention attracting tendency, leading to good transfer for such CM targets. Consistent training as a distractor decreases the attention-attracting tendency, leading to good transfer when new targets are introduced, because the normal attention-attracting tendency for these new targets is higher than the reduced tendency for the CM-trained distractors.
Perhaps the most important questions concerning the development of automatism involve the role of consistent training. We have seen that complete consistency (CM training) leads to automatic detection, and we have also seen that highly inconsistent training (VM) does not allow automatic detection to develop. Schneider and Fisk (1982b; also reported in Shiffrin, Dumais, & Schneider, 1981) have studied the degree of consistency necessary to produce automatism. Five conditions were used in which the percentages of time that an item spent as target versus distractor were varied. The ratios of target usage to distractor usage were 10:0, 10:5, 10:10, 10:20, and 9:61. The first of these conditions is a standard CM condition, and the last is a standard VM condition. Regardless of these ratios, the number of times that any item was presented as a target was held constant (except for the last condition, which received 10% fewer target presentations). The results showed that the first three conditions were all superior to the VM control. However, even after 6,000 trials, the fourth condition was close to the VM control. It is obvious that inconsistency does more than just slow the rate of automatization.
When an item appears as a distractor twice as often as it is used as a target, automatism may not develop at all. In addition, the results demonstrated that the lower the consistency, the slower was the rate of automatization. 4 The findings discussed in the preceding paragraphs and the findings in the 1977 articles provide a great deal of knowledge concerning the conditions that produce automatic detection (and by inference, automatism in general). They reinforce the conclusion reached in the 1977 articles: Consistency of training is the most important factor determining automatization. Ryan (1983) implies that subjects do not have control over controlled processing (and presumably do have control over automatic processing). However, his arguments are based solely on our failure to equate control processes with consciousness (pp. 4-5). Other researchers have tried to support such an identification (e.g., Posner & Klein, 1973) , but, although we discussed the issue, we were very careful not to do so. Ryan seems to be arguing that we should have made such an identification, and he then objects because the identification has problems. This is a curious argument indeed.
Control of Processing
Actually, we have quite extensive evidence that subjects can control their controlled processing. In the 1977 articles we showed that subjects can attend to a designated diagonal of a display, and Shiffrin and Schneider (1974) showed that attention could be given to an emphasized memory-set item. The attention literature is filled with examples such as those from dichotic listening tasks, in which processing can be directed toward a designated channel (say, a given ear). Also, knowledge of the location of a threshold visual stimulus improves detection accuracy, even when eye movements are controlled (e.g., Posner, 1978) .
More interesting are demonstrations that automatic processes are resistant to control. In Shiffrin and Schneider (1977) several examples of reversal training were given. After CM training, the roles of targets and distractors are reversed. Subjects could not ignore the previous CM targets, with the result that performance dropped even below the VM level seen at the start of training. Furthermore, relearning under CM training conditions took longer than the original training (pp. 132, 135) . In addition, it was shown that CM targets could not be ignored, even when instructions were given to do so, and when the CM target appeared in a known-to-be-irrelevant display location (pp. 150-151).
Other Criticism
A number of Ryan's (1983) points are unsupported, reactive statements, not only irrelevant but misleading and incorrect. For example, Ryan makes much of what he says is our claim to a "new and independent theory". Actually, in the first paragraph of our 1977 article we pointed out similarities to Atkinson and Shiffrin's (1968) article dealing with control processes, and then said: "However, despite the similarities in basic aims, the experiments lie in entirely different areas, and the present treatment is to be regarded as a new and independent theory to be evaluated in its own right" (Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977, p. 2) . Independence from the 1968 article, and independence from previous theories in general, are hardly equivalent concepts. Indeed, in the 1977 articles we discussed at length a number of related proposals by other researchers (e.g., Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977, pp. 171-184) .
Ryan argued at length in his note that we were doing nothing but renaming an old phenomenon and calling it a theory. It is obvious that Ryan failed to notice our presentation of 14 studies carried out in our laboratory, not to mention our extensive review of the literature.
We want to respond to Ryan's suggestion that our theory can be criticized because he has obtained data showing that automatic detection can occur without practice. The argument is based on his observation in the prememorized-list situation that flattening of the set-size function occurs even on the first tests of the experimental session. This argument is of course misapplied because learning potentially capable of producing automatic detection can occur during the training phase; more important, a familiarity process would produce a nonlinear function from the first test even in the absence of automatic detection. Apart from these observations, we are quite aware that some types of automatic detection operate on the basis of innate and/or preexperimental factors; the theory allows for such occurrences. Examples include the attention demands caused by a sudden, loud noise or by a stimulus differing from all of the others on simple, physical characteristics like size, color, or motion. Finally, we want to respond to Ryan's criticism that our theory applies to a narrow range of stimuli and tasks. The 1977 articles used a fairly narrow range of stimuli and tasks intentionally, to gain the stimulus control necessary to reach firm conclusions. We of course hope that the principles derived apply quite generally. The interested reader is invited to read results by Schneider and Fisk (1984) and Fisk and Schneider (1983) , which generalize the stimuli to which these principles apply.
Conclusion
Automatic processes and controlled processes are used in combination in all tasks. Automatic detection and controlled search are particular examples of these processes that are used in a surprisingly large number of visual-search and memory-search paradigms. Ryan seems to confuse the classes of processes with the particular examples, which leads him to use the prememorized-list paradigm to criticize our theory. We certainly think that automatic and controlled processes are used in that paradigm, but we rather doubt that controlled search and automatic detection play a very prominent role.
The remaining criticisms raised by Ryan were considered by us in the 1977 articles and were treated there in detail. Our present responses reiterate the points made then and allow us to extend and to further validate the theory by presenting additional evidence collected since 1977 (but published prior to Ryan's submission; we also call the reader's attention to newer work that extends these concepts: Schneider, 1983, and Fisk, 1984, in press-a, in press-b) . We feel now as we did then, that the theory raises more questions that it answers. Although we are satisfied that the present theoretical framework provides a coherent way of organizing a large number of empirical results, the theory is far from immune to criticism, and we hope that continuing research leads to a fruitful evolution of the approach.
